Evaluation of RSRM case hardware fretting concerns by Swauger, Thomas R.
TWR-60352
Solid Rocket Motors
Thiokol Corporation
EVALUATION OF RSRM
CASE HARDWARE FRETTING
CONCERNS
11 October 1990
Prepared for:
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER. ALABAMA 35812
Contract No.
DR. No.
WBS.No.
3-5
4C102
CORPORATION
SPACE OPERATIONS
P.O. Box 707, Brigham City, UT 84302-0707 (801) 863-3511
FORM TC4677 (REV 1-881
CMASA-CR-184287) E V A L U A T I O N C3F RSRH CASE
H A R D W A R E F R F T T I M G C O N C E R N S {Thioko l Corp. )
40 o CSCL 21H
N92-20243
Uncl <^s
G3/20 0377050
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19920011001 2020-03-17T13:21:38+00:00Z
TWR-60352
EVALUATION OF RSRM CASE
HARDWARE FRETTING CONCERNS
11 October 1990
Prepared by:
T. R. Swauger
Metal Component Design
Approved by:
sperry, Supervisor
4etal Component Design
Jx/M. Seil£f, Project Engineer
ise Project Engineer
J. V. Daines, Manager
Metallic Component Design
H. (?.' Rotter, Program Manager
Steel Case
B. Howard
SR&QA
T. K. Lai
Fracture Control Board
Released by:
Data Management
SS2432
CORPORATION
SPACE OPERATIONS
Contents
1.0 Introduction 1
1.1 Field Joint Fretting 2
1.2 Factory Joint Fretting 3
1.3 Overview of Effort 5
2.0 Conclusions and Recommendations 6
3.0 Discussion 9
3.1 Case Hardware Fretting in Detail 9
3.1.1 Field Joint Fretting in Detail 10
3.1.2 Factory Joint Fretting in Detail 11
3.2 Possible Fretting Scenarios 11
3.3 Case Refurbishment Requirements - Fretting 12
3.3.1 Refurbishment of Field Joint Fretting
3.3.2 Refurbishment of Factory Joint Fretting
3.4 Metallurgical Evaluation of Fretted Region
3.5 Flight Safety Concerns
3.5.1 Stress
3.5.2 Thermal Effects
3.5.3 Stress Corrosion Cracking
3.5.4 Fatigue Crack Growth
3.5.5 Joint Sealing
3.5.6 Other Concerns
Figures and Tables
Fig. 1: Field Joint Fretting Location
Fig. 2: Factory Joint Fretting Location
Fig. 3: Field Joint Fret Location
with Associated Scratch
Fig. 4: Inner Clevis Leg I.D. Seal Zone
Fig. 5: Fret Repair Entirely in Seal Zone
Fig. 6: Fret Repair, Blend Zone Projected
Into Interference Zone
Fig. 7: Fret Cross Section
Table I: Stress Under Flight Loads
Table II: Critical Crack Size, Fretted Regions
References
Appendices
:V,.,,ON DOCNO TWR-60352
12
16
17
18
• 19
20
21
23
24
27
2
4
10
14
15
15
18
19
23
28
29
| VOL
SEC 1 PAGE l.
CORPORATION
SPACE OPERATIONS
1.0 Introduction
Fretting corrosion was first noted on Shuttle flight STS-26.
This flight was the first usage of the Redesigned Solid Rocket
Motor (RSRM). The occurrence of fretting has since been
observed on both the field and factory joints of the RSRM. As
defined by G.A. Tomlinson (1939), fretting is a form of
corrosion that occurs at the interface between contacting,
highly loaded, metal surfaces when exposed to slight relative
vibratory motions. The resulting effect is a loss of metal
(pitting) and accumulation of metal and metal oxides on the
interfacing surfaces. The magnitude of the defect is a function
of the interface loads and the number of vibratory cycles to
which the interacting surfaces are exposed.
This report has been prepared to summarize the engineering
effort performed to evaluate the effect of fretting on the RSRM
case hardware. Based on the results of this evaluation, several
conclusions have been drawn concerning flight safety. Also,
recommendations have been made concerning trending the effects
of multiple generations of fretting damage, and further
evaluation of case service life concerns.
The remainder of this introduction will briefly address the
occurrence of fretting at both the field joint and factory joint
regions, as well as give an overview of the engineering effort
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performed to evaluate the effect of fretting on the RSRM
hardware.
1.1 Field Joint Fretting
The field joint fretting occurs at the capture feature/inner
clevis leg interface, see Figure 1 below.
Primary -
0-rtng .Pins
Figure 1: Field Joint Fretting Location
The capture feature interface did not exist prior to the Shuttle
Rocket Motor redesign and was the primary element in the case
hardware field joint change. The capture feature was added to
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the field joint configuration to control relative motion between
the inner clevis leg and the tang sealing surfaces during motor
pressurization. This motion was characteristic of the 51-L and
earlier Space Shuttle missions and requires the joint 0-rings to
track the growing seal gap. This becomes an insurmountable task
at colder temperatures when the 0-ring has lost some of its
resiliency. To provide the minimum possible relative motion
between these surfaces the capture feature was designed with an
interference fit over the inner clevis leg. Since the redesign,
fretting has become a regular occurrence at the field joints
with every motor since STS-26 exhibiting at least slight
fretting on a few of the joints.
1.2 Factory Joint Fretting
Also, recently becoming evident is the advent of fretting at the
factory joints. This occurrence had not been documented until
QM-7 and was first detected after flight on STS-29. However,
once brought to light the post flight data from STS-26 and STS-
27 was reviewed and it was determined some light fretting did
occur at the factory joint on these flights also.
The factory joint fretting occurs at the interface between the
inner clevis leg and the tang surface at the area of the land
between the primary and secondary 0-ring grooves. See Figure 2,
which illustrates this location. Factory joint fretting is much
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smaller in both magnitude and number than the fretting at the
field joint. The presence and/or awareness of the factory joint
fretting can be attributed to two factors:
1. The more severe fretting at the field joint brought us
to a greater awareness of the occurrence of fretting.
2. The field joint shims (pin retainer clips) were modified
during the SRM redesign to provide a "force" fit at the
outer clevis leg/tang gap. This fit changes the
relative positions of the surfaces exhibiting fretting.
Secondary 0-ring
Primary O-ring
Shim—:
Figure 2: Factory Joint Fretting Location
It is not clear whether fretting at the factory joint was
occurring prior to the redesign. The small indications could
have easily been attributed to other causes (rust, scratches,
etc..) and repaired per standard repair procedures without much
attention drawn to the occurrence.. The design change to
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increase factory joint shim thicknesses to obtain a "custom"
tighter fit may result in having a shim which is too thick
selected. By forcing a shim which is too thick into the shim
gap, the tang and clevis are forced to shift slightly, with
respect to each other, upon insertion. The shift brings the
surfaces known to exhibit fretting together, providing a greater
opportunity for local interface contact, as well as increased
interface pressures. This condition is thought to aggravate the
fretting problem, resulting in a larger number and slightly more
severe occurrences. Fretting at the factory joint is also now a
regular occurrence, with fretting noted on each of the flight
sets to date.
1.3 Overview of Effort
In an effort to provide an adequate understanding of the
fretting problem, and to alleviate flight safety concerns over
the occurrence of fretting, this report'addresses the following
topics:
1. Case Fretting in Detail
2. Possible Fretting Scenarios
3. Fretting Refurbishment Criteria
4. Metallurgical Concerns
5. Structural Concerns - Including Thermal Effects
6. Joint Seal Concerns
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Recommendations as to the non-critical nature of the concerns
are also made.
2.0 Conclusions and Recommendations
A thorough evaluation of fretting on the RSRM case hardware has
been performed. While we do not have a clear picture of the
exact scenario in which fretting occurs on the RSRM we can,
based on these evaluations, make an assessment of the resulting
damage and determine the effect on flight safety.
A metallurgical evaluation of an actual piece of fretted
hardware was performed to determine the extent of the damage to
the micro-structure of the material. This study revealed that
at each fret indication there is a very shallow (.0015 in. deep
or less) heat affected zone, as was expected. Also noted, was
the presence of surface micro-cracks. The micro-cracks are less
than .001 in depth, and run parallel to the contour of the-pit
along the interface between the heat affected zone and the
parent case material.
Stresses in the region of the fretting pits were also evaluated
for the flight load situation. The stresses all result in large
positive margins of safety, including the required 1.4 factor of
safety. To evaluate stress corrosion cracking concerns, stresses
in the region were evaluated for the as-assembled load case, as
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well as residual stresses in the region of the frets. Assembly
stresses are tensile, however, the magnitude is much less than
that which would result in a concern. Residual stresses at the
frets are compressive as indicated by X-ray diffraction
examination of an actual fret indication. Compressive stresses
do not support a stress corrosion environment. A fracture
mechanics analysis was performed for all of the regions
exhibiting fretting. The critical crack size was calculated for
each region. The critical crack size for each region is larger
than that which can be detected by Non-Destructive Examination
(NDE) during refurbishment. Also, the number of pressure cycles
required to propagate a crack from an undetectable size to the
critical size, is far larger than the safe life requirement of
four missions.
The case refurbishment specification requires that 0-ring
compression be evaluated at each seal surface fret repair
location, thus insuring adequate 0-ring squeeze is maintained.
Repairs in the interference zone are limited to the removal of
raised metal which maintains the integrity of the interference
fit, causing no significant thermal flow paths through the
interference fit.
All the.required inspections to the case have been implemented
during refurbishment which assures that any fretting defect
which falls outside our experience base, will require
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Material Review Board (MRB) action prior to usage. With all
these factors considered, fretting does not represent a safe
life concern. This eliminates the need to address this issue at
the Flight Readiness Reviews and allows added devotion to other
more pertinent items.
The issue of case attrition should not, however, be considered
closed. While we can assure flight safety on a one-by-one basis
thru refurbishment requirements, multiple generations of
fretting may eventually cause the dimensional requirements
(specifically those features which affect the interference fit)
to begin falling out of specification. At this point in time we
have very limited data concerning the effects of multiple
damage, therefore, useful life predictions are impossible to
make.
It is with this knowledge in mind that we make the following
recommendations. We must continue to closely monitor multiple
generations of fretting. This will provide engineering the
required information to identify possible trends which would
cause decreases in case life. It is also recommended that we
develop an automated system which is capable of inspecting, in
detail, local defect and repair zones. The data generated by
this equipment could then be put into a working data base to
support the trending effort.
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We must concurrently pursue load characterization and testing to
help evaluate the case service life concern. This would be best
accomplished by taking steps to instrument during the various
loading scenarios which are thought to be contributors in the
occurrence of fretting. Then institute a comprehensive testing
program, which more accurately simulates actual conditions.
Information gathered in this testing could be used two fold:
1. Testing would give us insight into the case life concern.
2. Testing would help characterize the actual mechanism of
fretting and may lead to a possible fix. Thus, totally
avoiding the service life concern.
As a last recommendation, the Quality Organization must move
quickly in completing their probability of detection study to
substantiate the magnetic particle inspection sensitivity level.
• This would insure that inspection requirements are met.
3.0 Discussion
3.1 Case Hardware Fretting in Detail
Both the fretting which is occurring at the field joint and the
factory joint have been identified as flight safety issues. To
better understand the phenomena each have been described in
detail in this report. Also, TWR-61070 "RSRM Joint Fretting
Summary" (preliminary) provides a flight by flight history of
the fretting damage which has been encountered.
ooc NO. TVR-60352
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3.1.1 Field Joint Fretting in Detail
The fretting which is occurring at the capture feature of the
field joint has very defined characteristics. A typical fret on
the clevis leg side of the interface is a small pit
approximately .004 to .005 inch deep and approximately .020 to
.060 inch wide. The most severe pit was .017 inch deep (STS-
29) which is a great deal larger than any other occurrence. The
capture feature side of the interface is-characterized by very
light pitting and the presence of slightly raised material.
During disassembly of the field joint, the raised metal present
on the capture feature leaves a small scratch trailing from the
pit on the clevis. This scratch is typically .0015 inch or less
deep, and less than .020 inch wide. Figure 3 below illustrates
typical field joint fretting as described.
Capture Feature
Scratch
Fretting
Indications
Clevis
Inner Leg
Figure 3: Field Joint Fret Indication with
Associated Scratch
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Figure Al in Appendix A, shows an actual photograph of a typical
clevis leg fret, note the scratch or "tail" trailing from the
pit towards the end of the part.
3.1.2 Factory Joint Fretting in Detail
The fretting characteristic of the factory joint is a very
shallow pit usually only .001-.002 inch deep and approximately
-.030 inch wide. The worst case instance is documented at ..004
inch deep. Occasionally very slight raised metal is associated
with these pits but is hardly detectable. Factory joint
fretting has been much less severe than that noted on field
joints. The number of indications is also much less than
fretting -on the field joint.
3.2 Possible Fretting Scenarios
The exact scenario for the occurrence of fretting on the RSRM is
not clearly understood. A number of possible scenarios have
been defined, however, it is not known which is the culprit, and
in fact it may be the combined effect of all, or an isolated few
of them. What is clear, however, is that no matter what the
scenario, two basic elements are required: contact pressure and
vibration. It is not the intent here to discuss each of these
possible scenarios in detail in this report. It does however,
seem prudent to outline them with a few brief conclusions.
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For those scenarios which occur without motor pressure the
capture feature interface pressures would be a direct result of
the assembly loads induced due to the interference fit.
However, in those scenarios which assume the fretting is
occurring during motor pressure, the resulting interface load
would be the combined effect of assembly loads and much higher
loads induced due to internal motor pressure. Even the lower
assembly loads can generate locally high interface pressures,
since the load is reacted out along a line of contact with very
little contact area. If you add to this effect the local
asperities on each of the contact surfaces, and possible case
out of roundness, very localized high pressure points are
definitely a possibility, even for the assembly load fretting
scenarios. Given the varied vibration environments and the
possi-bility of high local interface loads for both the
pressurized and non-pressurized cases it has proven very
difficult to determine the exact scenario for the occurrence of
fretting. Table Bl in Appendix B lists each possible scenario
with a brief statement where appropriate.
3.3 Case Refurbishment (Re-use) Requirements - Fretting
The major concern generated by fretting is the reuse of fretted
hardware. The case hardware has a reuse goal of 19 flights.
The cost effectiveness of the entire RSRM program is a direct
result of the ability to reuse this critical case hardware. In
DOC NO. TVR-60352 _ I *"•
_ PAGE
CORPORATION
SPACE OPERATIONS
order that we understand the concerns of flying fretted case
segments we must first have a thorough understanding of how
fretted indications are repaired and inspected during
refurbishment operations. The following data is compiled from
the RSRM Case Segment Refurbishment Specification (STW7-2744).
3.3.1 Refurbishment of Field Joint Fretting
The field joint fretting occurs at the capture feature
interface. Due to the interference, the inner clevis leg is
forced to bend slightly. This bending action forces hard
contact, and thus the major occurrence of fretting to be at the
extreme end of the interface. This area is extremely close to
the capture feature 0-ring seal surface. Jn fact, given
assembly tolerances what may be the interference zone for one
particular joint mate, may actually stray into the capture
feature seal zone for another mate. The refurbishment
specification must and does account for the worst case tolerance
seal zone, resulting in some fretting pits occurring in the
defined seal zone of the clevis leg. Fretting which occurs in
the seal zone is blended using an abrasive Dremel tool and a
final hand polish. As part of the repair procedure, 0-ring
squeeze requirements are verified for the reworked region to
insure minimum squeeze requirements have not been violated.
Also, the surface finish in the rework zone is reverified to
assure that original surface finish requirements are maintained.
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Fretting pits which occur in the seal zone but so near the
interference zone that the projected blend zone would cross into
the interference zone are feathered out in the axial direction
at the seal/interference zone boundary. By not allowing the
blend to extend into the interference zone the interference fit
is not compromised. Those pits which are entirely in the
interference zone are repaired by only breaking sharp edges and
removing raised metal. The entire capture feature tang fretting
region falls into this category of surface. Figures 4 thru 6
identify the seal and non-seal zones as well as illustrate the
required rework for the various situations we have described
above .
— 0.997 —
.66
INTERFERENCE
ZONE
SEAL SURFACE
I
Figure 4: Inner Clevis Leg I.D. Seal Zone
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• NON-SEAL
ZONE
NOTE:
0 = INITIAL DEPTH OF DEFECT
W = INITIAL WIDTH OF DEFECT
BLENO TO FULL.
DEPTH OF DEFECT
NON-SEAL
ZONE
INITIAL DEFECT
BLENO ZONE
SEAL SURFACE
ENTIRE REPAIR ZONE TO
BE BLENDED SMOOTHLY
Figure 5: Fret Repair Entirely in Seal Zone
•NON-SEAL ZONE SEAL 20NE-
BOUNOARY
NOTE:
D = INITIAL DEPTH OF DEFECT
W = INITIAL WIDTH OF DEFECT
BLEND TO FULL
DEPTH OF DEFECT
INITIAL DEFECT
BLEND ZONE
SEAL SURFACE
INSIDE THE SEAL ZONE THE
ENTIRE REPAIR ZONE SHALL
BE BLENDED SMOOTHLY
Figure 6: Fret Repair, Blend Zone Projected
Into Interference Zone
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It should also be noted that no pitting in excess of .010 inch
deep is permitted by the specification. Any pit which exceeds
this limitation must be evaluated through formal Material Review
Board (MRB) action.
The segment is proof tested at 1.12 times the maximum expected
operating pressure prior to each usage. After the proof test a
magnetic particle inspection is performed to detect surface
cracks. The Refurb Specification requires that no cracks greater
than .100 long are acceptable.
3.3.2 Refurbishment of Factory Joint Fretting
As indicated earlier, fretting at the factory joint occurs at
the land between the primary and secondary 0-ring grooves. The
tang surface at this interface is considered to be a seal
surface and the fretting pits are blended just as those for
frets on the field joint surface. Non-seal surfaces of the
clevis have only the raised metal and sharp edges removed. The
extent of the fretting damage at the factory joint is much less
severe than the field joint fretting and results in very small
blends. As in field joint fretting the case component is
magnetic particle inspected and proof tested prior to it's next
usage.
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3.4 Metallurgical Evaluation of Fretted Region
In an effort to understand the micro-structure of the fret, an
actual piece of fretted flight hardware from mission STS-27 was
sectioned to perform a metallurgical study (Reference TWR-
19666). The cross section of the fretting pit was examined
using high magnification and x-ray diffraction. It was
determined that a residue of metal oxides was present on the
surface at the region of the fret. This presence of oxides is
evidence that fretting is really a form of corrosion. The pits
also showed a thin (.001 inch or less) discontinuous layer of
white martensite at the surface of the pits. The total depth of
the heat affected zone, excluding the white martensite, was
approximately .0015 inch deep. The heat affected zone is caused
by the very localized hot spots generated by the fretting
action. Also observed, was the presence of small micro-cracks
at the surface of the pitted region. These micro-cracks were
shown to be .001 inch or less deep and did not extend into the
parent material. The cracks are approximately .003 inch long and
run parallel to the contour of the pit at the approximate
boundary between the martensite and the heat affected regions. A
typical cross section of a fret pit is shown in Figure 7 which
\
illustrates some of the details described above. Figure A2 in
Appendix A shows a 500X photo of one of the sectioned frets.
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0.005 in.
_ 0.004 in
0.001 in.
0.0015 in.J
White Martensite
Micro-Crack
Heat-Affected Zone
Parent Material
Figure ~li Fret Cross Section
3.5 Flight Safety Concerns
The flight safety concerns caused by fretting can be broken down
into five major categories:
1. Stress- Due to Flight Loading
2. Thermal Effects to the Case Structure
3. Stress Corrosion Crack Growth
4. Fatigue Crack Growth
5. Joint Seal Effects
Each of these concerns must be evaluated to establish the flight
safety of the fretted hardware.
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3.5.1 Flight Safety Concerns - Stress
The regions on the case segments which are affected by fretting
are areas of low to moderate stress. The stresses are
summarized below in Table I with the associated margins of
safety (MS) for each region affected by fretting:
Table I: Stress Under Flight Loads
Field Joint
* Inner Clevis Leg Maximum Stress: 113 ksi, MS = 0.26
* Capture Feature Maximum Stress: 75 ksi, MS = .90
Factory Joint
* Inner Clevis Leg Maximum Stress: 75 ksi, MS = .90
* Tang Maximum Stress: 107 ksi, MS = .33
Reference: "RSRM Structural Analysis Field Joint"
TWR-17118 Supplement. B
Note: Margins of safety are based on a factor of safety of 1.4
As shown in the table, stresses are not so severe that the
slight local stress risers associated with pitting in this
region would be a concern. It should be recalled that any pit
exceeding .010 inch deep would require MRB action. Fretting and
fretting repairs will not result in a stress problem with
adequate margins of safety being maintained.
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3.5.2 Thermal Effects on Structural Integrity
The only defects associated with fretting which would effect the
thermal analysis of the baseline field joint design, are those
which a.) compromise the capture feature 0-ring's ability to
seal, and b.) allow an unrestricted gas path across the entire
axial length of the interference fit. As we will establish in
section 3.5.5.1, fretting will not compromise the capture
feature 0-ring's ability to seal. Assuming that the proper
rework is performed on the fret indications, the only portion of
the fret defect which crosses the entire interference fit, is
the disassembly scratch which was depicted in Figure 3. A
thermal analysis was performed to evaluate the effect of this
condition (Reference Memo L213:FY89:M162, "Flow Thermal and
i
Erosion Analysis for RSRM Interference Fit Fretting"),
temperatures generated in this analysis were much less severe
than those used to evaluate the field joint fail-safe thermal
loads. Therefore, the structural ramifications of the thermal
analysis performed to evaluate the fretting scratch are not
significant. This subject is treated in more detail in TWR-
18585, "Structural Analysis of the RSRM Nozzle to Case and Field
Joint Designs for Fail-Safe Thermal Loads". Reference also
TWR-60353, "Map of Flow/Thermal Limits for RSRM Field Joint Non-
interference Gaps", which documents a parametric study of
thermal effects of various non-interference conditions.
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There i.s no effect to the other redundant features of the field
joint design. Therefore, thermal effects due to the presence of
fretting do not result in a specific structural concern.
3.5.3 Flight Safety Concerns- Stress Corrosion Cracking
In order for stress corrosion cracking to occur several factors
must be present:
1. Surface Tensile Stress- applied or residual
2. Susceptible Material Structure
3. Corrosive Environment
With the right combination of the above, this phenomenon can
take an environment which would otherwise result in only
superficial corrosion Damage and induce sometimes rapid crack
propagation.
3.5.3.1 Surface Stresses
Assembly stresses at the fretted region are low at approximately
11 ksi (tensile) as indicated in the report TWR-17118 Supplement
B, "RSRM Case Structural Analysis Field Joint". The
metallurgical evaluation using x-ray diffraction on an .008 inch
deep pit from STS-27 showed that there were very high residual
compressive stresses at the very surface of the fret area.
While these compressive stresses diminished with depth,
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compressive stresses were found to extend to a depth of .010
inch. Below the .010 level stresses were found to be near zero
with only very low tensile stresses (Reference: TWR-19666,
"Measurement of Residual Stresses on Fretted Area of RSRM Case
Segment 1U50717 S/N 053", Preliminary).
3.5.3.2 Material Structure
For the case material (D6AC Steel) stress corrosion cracking
will not occur at tensile stresses of less than 38 ksi versus
the 11 ksi maximum assembly stress. This stress limit was based
on a lower bound (-3tr) threshold stress .intensity (Kiscc) of 11
ksilfin. for D6AC steel and a .10 inch long semi-circular surface
flaw (Reference: TWR-16873, "Fracture Control Plan for Space
Shuttle RSRM Case"). Compressive stresses do not contribute to
stress corrosion crack growth. Therefore, stress corrosion
cracking of the fret pits is not a concern.
3.5.3.3 Environment
The last requirement for stress corrosion crack propagation is
an environment which supports corrosion. The fretted regions
are both stored and assembled with an application of HD-2
calcium grease, a very reliable corrosion preventative. This
grease provides an excellent barrier against moisture. Given
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these conclusions, conditions do not support stress corrosion
crack propagation and it is not a flight safety concern.
3.5.4 Flight Safety Concerns - Fatigue Crack Growth
Fatigue crack growth is the propagation of cracks due to cyclic
loading. A fracture mechanics analysis was performed for each
of the specific areas exhibiting fretting (Reference TWR-16873).
The stresses used for each region in this evaluation are those
which were previously documented in Table I. The critical crack
size for each region is documented in Table II.
TABLE II: Critical Crack Size, Fretted Regions
Location Critical Crack Size
Field Joint:
* Inner Clevis Leg 0.3 in. Lg. x .15 Dp.
* Capture Feature 0.3 in. Lg. x .15 Dp.
Factory Joint:
* inner Clevis Leg .72 in. Lg. x thru
* Tang .52 in. Lg. x thru
Reference: TWR-16873, "Fracture Control Plan for RSRM Case"
As is shown the critical crack size for each of these areas is
well above the actual fret size and extremely larger than the
micro-crack length of .003 inch. It can be concluded that
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fatigue growth of a fret indication is not a concern, since the
analysis also indicates that the number of cycles required to
propagate the crack from an undetectable size (less than .10
inch) to the critical crack size is much larger than the safe
life requirement of four missions.
3.5.5 Flight Safety Concerns - Sealing
The effect of fretting on the joint sealing function also
deserves evaluation. The three 0-ring seals at the field joint
are the capture feature 0-ring, the primary 0-ring and the
secondary 0-ring, as shown earlier in Figure 1. The factory
joint has only the primary and secondary 0-rings (Reference
"Figure 2). At each of these joints the insulation configuration
also provides a major sealing function. For the factory joint
the insulation is considered to be the primary seal. The
insulation is unaffected by fretting. The effects of fretting
on sealing are evaluated in the following sections.
3.5.5.1 Field Joint Seals - Capture Feature
As shown in Figure 1 the capture feature 0-ring gland is located
just aft of the interference area. Case hardware tolerances in
this area are such that case to case variances allow the
interference surface for one case joint mate to stray slightly
into the capture feature seal zone in another joint mate. The
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concern is that the seal surface fretting damage could be left
unchecked leaving a defect which could impair the sealing
function during the next case usage. This requires that the
refurb specification take worst case tolerances into account
when specifying the proper repair of fretted regions. As shown
earlier in the Section 3.3 defects which fall into the capture
feature 0-ring footprint area are blended to assure a smooth
contour is maintained. The case refurbishment specification
(STW7-2744) defines the requirements for this repair. The blend
zone is always verified to assure the surface finish meets
original requirements, and 0-ring squeeze calculations must be
performed to determine the acceptability of the repair.
3.5.5.2 Field Joint Seals - Primary and Secondary
The effect to the primary and secondary seal function is
somewhat of a secondary effect. The concern would be that the
fretting damage would be so severe as to eliminate the
interference fit, thus affecting the dynamics of the joint
during motor pressurization. The interference fit of the
capture feature is required to insure that the 0-rings can meet
a 2X tracking factor during motor pressurization. The fretting
defects have not been so severe that this would be a concern in
and of itself. The inner clevis leg has more than adequate
bending stiffness to bridge the very localized fretting pits
with no effect to seal performance. The concern arises over
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insuring that the proper rework gets performed in the
interference zone. Large blends in this region would be
detrimental to the life expectancy of the hardware. Numerous
large reworks would eventually affect the overall case diameter
thus reducing the interference fit. The case refurbishment
specification again establishes the rework requirements insuring
that the frets in the interference zone only have raised metal
removed and sharp edges broken. It is also worth mentioning
that prior to making all field joint assignments the
interference fit is determined for each mate based on
refurbishment measurements. The interference value must meet
the requirements of STW9-3668 (.002 inch radial interference)
before it is considered an acceptable mate. Therefore, there is
no safety cojicern over the loss of interference. However, the
accumulative effect of multiple generations of fretting must be
monitored and evaluated before assessing the effect to case
life.
3.5.5.3 Factory Joint - Primary and Secondary O-rings
As we have indicated earlier factory joint fretting has been
very light in comparison to field joint fretting. The location
of this fretting has been illustrated in Figure 2. The only
concern is fretting damage to the seal surfaces. As with field
joint fretting the frets which fall within a factory joint seal
zone are blended per the requirements of the case refurbishment
/
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specification (Reference Section 3.3). 0-ring squeeze
calculations are performed and surface finish requirements are
reverified after the rework is complete to determine the
acceptability of the repair. Those fret indications which fall
outside of the seal zone have raised metal removed and sharp
edges broken.
During refurbishment of fretted segments, all necessary repairs
are made. The refurbishment specification has been updated to
clarify the criteria for allowable repairs of fret indications.
Defects will have no affect on seal tracking. The insulation on
both joints are unaffected by fretting. Therefore, fretting
does not represent a seal flight safety concern.
*
3.5.6 Other Concerns
In an effort to present a complete picture of the evaluation
performed concerning the fretting investigation, memo L640-
FY90-M005 has been attached in Appendix C. This memo documents
Thiokol's response to several other concerns (not addressed
otherwise in this report) raised by Dr. Hoeppner, Thiokol's
consultant for the fretting investigation.
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APPENDIX A
Figures
Figure Al: Photo of Field Joint
Clevis Leg Fret
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APPENDIX A: Continued
Original magnification 500X Original magnification 500X
Figure A2: Magnified Cross Section of
Actual Pit
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Appendix B
Tables
Table Bl: Possible Fretting Scenarios
• Conclusion—Exact scenario for fretting occurrence is unknown
• Rollout
• Prelaunch
• Flight readiness
firing (FRF)
• Lift-off
• Flight
• Staging
• Reentry
• Recovery System
Deployment
• Water Entry
• Floatation
• Towback
Relative joint motions analyzed using RSRM global structural
model, Rockwell International (Rl) load cases, and 61 -G
rollout data
Results indicate lift-off has higher amplitude but a low
number of cycles. Rollout and prelaunch has lower amplitude
and a high number of cycles
FRF dismissed after fretting observed on STS-27
Dynamic environment not currently defined except for early
flight
Some flight Rl load cases are available. Global models being
modified for various burn times
STS-26, STS-27, and STS-29 development flight instrumenta-
tion (DPI) data being processed
DFI revealed that Max-Q reentry is a significant event rivaling
lift-off and splashdown in severity
Dynamic environment not currently defined
Feasibility of barge retrieval, towback testing, towback
analysis, and/or towback monitoring being studied
• More probable causes
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APPENDIX C
Memo L640-FY90-M008
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L640-FY90-M008
TO:
FROM:
CC:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
S. Goleniewski
Project Engineering, Case
Ting Lai
Analytical Methods
J. Daines, R. Webster, D. Mason, K. Sperry,.
J. Kapp
Fretting Damage Influence on Flight Safety
Dr. Hoeppner's letter to Don Mason (7/10/89)
SUMMARY
Dr. Hoeppner, Thiokol's consultant for fretting
investigation, met Thiokol Engineering Design personnel
(J. Daines, R. Webster, D. Mason, K. Sperry and T. Lai) on
10 August, 1989 to discuss the concerns in his letter,
referenced above. Later, Dr. Hoeppner attended the Fretting
Team Meeting held by telecon with Thiokol team members and
MSFC personnel.
Since Dr. Hoeppner wrote the referenced letter, additional
information has been obtained from metallurgical evaluation
of sectioned case segment S/N 53. This information is very
encouraging; it removes most of the concerns about fretting
damage effects on flight safety.
This memo is to address Dr. Hoeppner's concerns and
summarize the results of our discussion with him. Some open
issues remain and should be addressed in an orderly process.
P.O Box 707, Brigham City. UT 84302-0707 (8011863-3511
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At present, however, the information available suggests that
even though all of the contributing factors are not known,
the phenomenon of fretting has not produced enough damage to
the material to pose a flight safety risk.
DISCUSSION
Each issue raised in the referenced letter is discussed
below.
1. Metallurgical evaluation of fretted case, S/N 53
Dr. Hoeppner found that the following results of the
metallurgical evaluation are very encouraging. They
support the conclusion that the fretting-related
disruption of the material is very localized and does
not represent a major fracture mechanics problem.
a. Depth of pits - actual depth of pits measured by
microscope were only about two mils deeper than those
measured by micrometer.
b. Cracks within the pits - microcracks observed on the
surface of fretted pits are contained in the white
martensite layer or extend parallel to the interface
between the white martensite and the softer material
underneath. None of the observed cracks penetrate '
into the parent material.
c. Microstructural changes in the fretted pits — Hard
white martensite was formed at the surface on fretted
pits; underneath is a layer of softer material. The
total thickness of white martensite and the softer
layer measured only about 2 mils.
2. Load spectra
Dr. Hoeppner stated that the exact loading conditions
for the case segment life cycle is required to simulate
and identify when fretting occurred, and to evaluate the
service life of the case segments. However, exact
loading conditions during rollout and towback are still
unknown. Only very limited information is available.
It was obtained during rollout of 61G. He also
expressed concerns about the lack of detail in our
flight load models.
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Dr. Hoeppner recommended that load and motor response be
monitored to acquire accurate information during rollout
and towback. This is a reasonable recommendation and
should be pursued. It should be noted, however, that
our flight schedule will require that hardware with
fretting damage will need to be used before those
measurements can be obtained.
3. Fatigue crack initiation and propagation
Dr. Hoeppner has questioned whether the crack growth
data of D6AC steel, using compact tension specimens
tested with long cracks, is applicable for growth of
short cracks resulting from fretting.
Dr. Newman of NASA, LaRC was asked on July 17, 1989 if
he has any short crack test data of D6AC steel. He
stated that LaRC has tested short crack (single edge
notch surface crack) for AISI 4340 steel, which is very
similar to D6AC steel. The results indicated the crack
growth data based on compact tension specimen tests is
applicable for long cracks as well as short cracks. Dr.
Newman has since sent Dr. Hoeppner and Dr. Lai copies of
the test report.
Dr. Hoeppner expressed concerns over the effect of R
ratio and the dwell time at maximum load on fatigue
crack propagation, of D6AC steel. However, Thiokol has
crack growth test data for R = 0.1 and marker band crack
growth data for R = 0.8, at maximum load of proof test
and flight condition. That data has strong evidence
that dwell time does not have significant influences on
crack growth rate for flight condition. In addition, the
test data also indicates that the modified Forman
equation of NASA/FLAGRO, which incorporates the R ratio
. effect on fatigue crack growth rate, is applicable for
D6AC steel.
Based on the fracture toughness test data, crack growth
rate of D6AC steel, and Thiokol NDE inspection
capability, the safe-life analysis indicates that the
current fretted condition of case segments will not
cause fracture during the next flight after passing the
proof test and NDE inspection.
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However, to predict the residual life of a fretted
segment and evaluate the reusability of case segments,
Dr. Hoeppner recommended that fatigue testing of fretted
sections of S/N 53 with various pit depths should be
performed.
4. Temperature effect on the fracture toughness of D6AC
steel
Dr. Hoeppner expressed his concern that the temperature
effect on the fracture toughness and crack growth of
D6AC steel may have significant implication for the
Space Shuttle launched at low temperature. Indeed, the
data from fracture toughness tests conducted at NASA
LaRC and Westinghouse at various temperatures show that
the the fracture toughness of D6AC may be substantially
reduced at lower temperatures. Fracture mechanics
analysis based on this characterization data was used to
establish a minimum case temperature of 35 degrees
Fahrenheit as a launch constraint for RSRM. There is no
intent to remove that constraint.
Of the concerns expressed by Dr. Hoeppner, two of them are
not fully addressed by constraints currently imposed,
related information available, or planned efforts. The two
open issues are the load spectrum definition and the fatigue
life of the fretted segments. There are plans-being
formulated to make measurements of lo.ads and responses
during rollout and towback. When this information is
available, it can be factored into the fretting evaluations.
The experimental investigation of the effects of the
fretting damage on the fatigue life of D6AC will require a
large number of specimens. The test specimens can be cut
from the damaged case, S/N 53 and tested with various
combinations of damage depth, mean load, and cyclic load.
Some further analytical sensitivity studies are needed
before recommendations regarding this test program to be
made.
